Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

State of Utah v. Todd Jeremy Little : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeremy M. Delicino; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State of Utah v. Todd Jeremy Little, No. 20100885 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2588

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20100885-CA

vs.
TODD JEREMY LITTLE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Appellant is not incarcerated
:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 5837-8(2)(a)(i), AND POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 5 8-3 7a-5( 1), IN THE SECOND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, THE HONORABLE SCOTT M.
HADLEY, PRESIDING.

Jeremy M. Delicino
10 West Broadway, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-6474
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Marian Decker
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

FILED
{

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DEC 2 9 2011

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20100885-CA

vs.
TODD JEREMY LITTLE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Appellant is not incarcerated
:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 5837-8(2)(a)(i), AND POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l),INTHESECOND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, THE HONORABLE SCOTT M.
HADLEY, PRESIDING. .

Jeremy M. Delicino
10 West Broadway, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-6474
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Marian Decker
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6lh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1

INTRODUCTION
ARGUMENT

2

THE INCULPATORY EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF MR.
LITTLE'S ILLEGAL DETENTION AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED
PURSUANT TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
2
CONCLUSION

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.

11

CASES CITED
Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47 (1979)

3

Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S. 431 (1984)

7

State v. Chism, 107 P.3d 706 (Utah 2005)

3

State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d460 (Utah 1991)

7

State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1991)

8

State v. Toponotes. 76 P.3d 1159 (Utah Sup. Ct. 2003)

7

State v. Vialpando, 89 P.3d 209 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)

3

State v. Worwood. 164 P.3d 397 (Utah 2007)
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

3, 8, 9
3, 4

Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963)

n
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20100885-CA

vs.
TODD JEREMY LITTLE,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Appellant is not incarcerated
:

INTRODUCTION
Appellant Todd Jeremy Little, ("Mr. Little"), was illegally detained when law
enforcement seized him without reasonable articulable suspicion and then detained and
questioned him for 20 minutes without any objective evidence of theft. For the first time, the
State now claims that this Court may affirm on the basis that the detention bore no causal
relationship to the discovery of the evidence in Mr. Little's truck. As discussed below,
contrary to the State's position, the evidence found in Mr. Little's truck was the fruit of his
unlawful detention, and this Court should therefore reverse the trial court's denial of Mr.
Little's motion to suppress.
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ARGUMENT
THE INCULPATORY EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF MR.
LITTLE'S ILLEGAL DETENTION AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE
SUPPRESSED PURSUANT TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Mr. Little was illegally seized when Officers Warren and Peterson continued to detain
and question him after loss prevention informed the officers that they did not observe Mr.
Little commit theft and the officers themselves did not have any objective evidence of theft.
Further, the evidence observed in Mr. Little's truck was only discovered as a result of the
fishing expedition that the officers embarked upon while Mr. Little was being illegally
detained, and therefore should be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule.
A.

Mr. Little Was Unreasonably and Illegally Detained

]

Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution, once Officers Warren and Peterson learned from loss prevention
that Mr. Little did not take or conceal any merchandise, coupled with their unfruitful searches
of both Mr. Little and Mr. Hodgson, any reasonable suspicion which may have existed at that
point dissipated and Mr. Little was entitled to be released.2 Instead, since Officers Warren
and Peterson continued to detain Mr. Little without evidence of criminal activity, the
resulting 20-minute detention was unreasonable and thus illegal.
1

This brief summary of the illegal detention, argued in detail in Mr. Little's opening
brief, is set forth in order to fully address the State's new contention that there is no
causal relationship between the illegal detention and the discovery of the evidence.
2

Mr. Little maintains that there was not sufficient justification for the initial seizure. See
Aplt Br. ati:2r
" " " "
"
"" "
"
""
2
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An investigative detention is permissible only when officers "have reasonable
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity."
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). The reasonableness of an officer's actions in the
context of an investigative detention requires a dual inquiry. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT
47, 1{ 25, 164 P.3d 397. Courts must first consider "whether the officer's actions was
justified at its inception. I d (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). Second, courts
consider whether the length and scope of the detention are "'strictly tied to and justified by'
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." I d "Investigative acts that are
not reasonably related to dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for the stop are
permissible only if they do not add to the delay already lawfully experienced and do not
represent any further intrusion on the detainee's rights. State v. Chismu 2005 UT App 41, ^f
15, 107 P.3d 706 (internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Indeed, "it is
axiomatic that once the officer's suspicion has been alleviated the officer must allow the
detainee to go on his way without further interference by the officer." State v. Vialpando, 89
P.3d 209, 212 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).
In this case, the continued detention of Mr. Little by Officers Warren and Peterson
was not strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which may have rendered its
initiation permissible. Contrary to the State's argument, the fact that loss prevention reported
to the officers that no theft had occurred is a fact that warrants reversal of the trial court's
ruling. This is especially tme since the officers themselves had no objective evidence of

3
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criminal activity as required by Terry. According to Officer Warren, loss prevention told him
that "they didn't observe any of the suspects conceal anything and leave the store." R.
171:17. He likely knew this before he escorted Mr. Little to the north doors and certainly
once he arrived there:
[ W]e got everyone together and had a powwow to discuss what had taken place. We
turned to lost prevention . . . and they says, 'Well, they don't know what they're doing,
but — they didn't take nothing
R. 171:28. When questioned by the trial court on this fact, Officer Warren again confirmed
that he knew from loss prevention that Mr. Little did not steal anything:
Q.

THE COURT: At that point had you been informed from dispatch, who was
dealing with the lost prevention officer, that they did not observe Mr. Little
steal anything?

A.

You know, I'm not sure if they advised it over the air for certain. Once we met
over at the north doors, they did advise it there that, you know, they didn't
actually see them conceal anything or steal anything.

R. 171:34-35. Officer Peterson also knew from loss prevention officer, Mr. Leon, that Mr.
Little had not stolen anything: "Q. At some point in that conversation does Mr. Leon inform
you that the suspects had not attempted to steal any merchandise? A. Yes, sir." R. 171:58.
He knew this prior to Mr. Little and Mr. Hodgson even exiting the store. R. 171:58.
Further, the officers themselves did not observe or discover any evidence of a theft.
When Mr. Little came out of the store Officer Warren didn't notice any bulges in his pockets.
R. 171:18. Mr. Little was not carrying a backpack that may have concealed merchandise. R.
1 71:34. Officer Warren patted him down and did not find any evidence of a theft. R.
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171:18-19,112-113. Indeed, Officer Warren testified that Mr. Little did not have anything
concealed on his person. R. 171:28. Similarly, Officer Peterson searched Mr. Hodgson and
did not find any evidence of theft. Contrary to the State's argument, it is not a reasonable
inference that Mr. Little could have concealed something in the vehicle, since loss prevention
was watching, tracking, and "continually following" the two of them the entire time and did
not see any theft occur. R. 171:5, 16, 44. This conjecture, to the extent it is even supported
in the evidence, did not justify the continued detention.
The State argues that Mr. Little gave varying and inconsistent statements and that this
justified the lengthy detention. Appellee Br. at 20-21.

Any inconsistency, however, was

manufactured by the officers through Mr. Little's illegal detention. Officers Warren and
Peterson continued to question Mr. Little knowing that he had not stolen any merchandise.
it was only during this questioning that the officers asked him how he arrived at the store.
There was nothing inconsistent about his statement until Officer Jones arrived on the scene,
sought out and interviewed Ms. Little, then came back and compared her statement with that
from Mr. Little.3 Indeed, when Officer Jones arrived on scene, he was there on a fishing
expedition in hopes that something might turn up:

3

The State's argument that this inconsistency heightened the officers' suspicion is
especially unavailing since the officers themselves did not believe it was sufficient to
justify Mr. Little's detention. Indeed, after illegally detaining Mr. Little for 20 minutes
and with the inconsistency on how he arrived at the store, they believed there was
insufficient evidence for further detention and told him he was free to leave. This
statement, however, as argued in Mr. Little's opening brief, was meaningless at that point.
tee"Aplt Br. a t 16^19. - - 5
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Q.

Were you requested to the scene after some time — after they had been there for
some time?

A.

I wasn't requested to respond, no. I just responded over.

Q.

Okay. Did you just do this on your own volition, your own inclination?

A.

When I heard the off-- actually, I was busy with other calls, but when I heard
the officers talking about more than one person involved inside of the store,
they were watching opposite doors and stuff, I decided to go over there when
I finished some other stuff to help out, just in case something happened.

Q.

Okay. When you amved, did you receive some information from the officers
that were on scene?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

What was that information?

A.

That there was a — there was two males they had made contact with, and they
said there was another female that was possibly associated with the two males
that may be involved with something.

R. 171:76-77 (emphasis added). This vague statement from Officer Jones accurately sums
up the amount of evidence that Officers Warren and Peterson had when they continued to
detain and question Mr. Little. It is not: objective evidence of criminal activity based upon
specific and articulable facts. Thus, at the time when Officer Jones arrived, reasonable
suspicion had been dispelled. The subsequent inconsistency of how Mr. Little amved at the
store, an inconsistency which was irrelevant to whether he stole merchandise, did not heighten
or justify the continued detention of Mr. Little.
Ultimately, Mr. Little was not being detained in order for the officers to determine
whether a theft had occurred. They knew from loss prevention that nothing had been taken.
They knew this either prior to the suspects exiting the store or shortly thereafter. They knew
from their searches of both suspects that nothing was concealed or stolen. And they never
evenbothered to determine whether -anything had been taken from the television. Indeed,
6
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once loss prevention informed the officers that they did not observe any theft, and law
enforcement themselves did not have any objective evidence of theft, any conceivable
reasonable suspicion ended at that point and Mr. Little should have been free to go.
B.

The Evidence in Mr. Little's Vehicle was Discovered as a Result of the
Officers Exploitation his Illegal Detention.

Contrary to the State's argument, the evidence in Mr. Little's truck was obtained as a
result of his illegal detention and therefore should be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary
rule.

The exclusionary rule both under the United States Constitution and the Utah

Constitution "prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative (the c fruit of
unlawful police conduct'), obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional and statutory
rights." State v. Toponotes, 2003 UT 30, f 13,76 P.3d 1159 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431 ^ 442-43, (1984)); see also State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1991) (plurality
opinion) ("We now expressly hold that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary
consequence of police violations of article I, section 14."). Furthermore, the State's argument
fails to recognize that not only will primary and derivative evidence be suppressed, but also
that evidence which is obtained as the result of the exploitation of an unreasonable detention.
Indeed, "[t]he exclusionary rule applies not only to evidence obtained directly as a result of
the illegal seizure, but also to evidence obtained by exploitation of the illegality, unless the
evidence was obtained by means 'sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
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taint/"State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 786 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S.
47U 488 (1963)). 4
In the case of State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 164 P.3d 397, the Utah Supreme Court
rejected the argument the State has set forth in the case sub judice. I d f 45. In Worwood,
evidence was obtained after law enforcement conducted a de facto arrest without probable
cause when the officer transported Worwood to a different location to conduct the field
sobriety tests. I d ^ j 27-33. Just as in this case, the State attempted to argue that the illegal
detention was not the but for cause of the administration of the field sobriety tests. I d <f[ 45.
In other words, the State argued that regardless of whether Worwood was illegally detained,
the officer would have administered the field sobriety tests anyway and therefore there was
no causal link between the unlawful detention and results of these tests. I d This position was
rejected:
. . . Worwoods illegal detention was the but-for cause of Officer Kevin
Wright's administration of the field sobriety tests at Wright's home. There was
no intervening event to break the causal chain. The fact that before the
illegality reasonable suspicion would have justified further investigation does
not break the actual linkages between the illegal detention and the field
sobriety tests. Investigations under reasonable suspicion do not have a shelf
life, unlike a transportable warrant. An officer must either confirm the
suspicion by establishing probable cause for arrest or dispel the suspicion and
release the suspect. Wright took neither constitutional path. Instead, he not
only exploited the illegality in order to obtain the evidence needed for probable

4

The State has not argued any exception to the exclusionary rule. In fact, the State
affirmatively stated that this Court need not even address whether Mr. Little's purported
consent attenuated the illegal detention from the discovery of the evidence in his pickup
since the State did not rely on that theory below and does not do so on appeal. See
Appellee Br. at 25 n. 4.
~~ ~
8
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cause, he arguably created the illegality in order to obtain the evidence without
conducting the arrest himself. The field sobriety tests would not have been
obtained absent the illegality or different choices by Wright.
fd. ^] 47. Thus, the court concluded there was a causal connection since "[a]bsent the
i 1 legality, Wright may have conducted the field sobriety tests on the roadside, but he may have
just as likely released Worwood to avoid the trouble of making an off-duty arrest." Id. ^f 49.

In this case, the evidence seized from Mr. Little's truck was derived from the police
misconduct since it never would have been discovered but for the illegal detention. As
discussed above, Mr. Little was illegally detained as soon as the officers knew from loss
prevention that Mr. Little did not commit a theft coupled with their lack of objective evidence
of theft. This occurred almost immediately after Mr. Little left the store. Had Mr. Little been
released instead of illegally detained and questioned he would have been free to get in his
truck and leave. Instead, the officers continued to detain and question him on how he arrived
at the store in their 20 minute attempt to create a reason for further detention.
Just as in Worwood, the officers in this case exploited Mr. Little's illegal detention
when Jones arrived and sought out Ms. Little. It was only from Ms. Little that Officer Jones
learned that Mr. Little drove to the store, and the specific information that Mr. Little was
driving a white truck. Indeed, only as a result of the illegal detention did the officers form
a reason to search for Mr. Little's vehicle. Had Mr. Little been released prior to this
continued detention and questioning he would have been free to get in his car and leave.
9
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Simply put, the drug evidence would not have been obtained absent the illegality or different
choices by Officers Warren, Peterson, and Jones. These officers exploited the illegality in
order to manufacture some evidence to justify a basis for further detention. The evidence
found in Mr. Little's truck is, therefore, the logical fruit of the unreasonable detention. The
State's argument that Mr. Little's detention bore no causal relation to either the discovery of
the pickup or the drug evidence is without merit.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Officers Warren, Peterson and Jones conducted an unconstitutionally
expansive investigatory detention of Mr. Little. The inculpatory evidence obtained from Mr.
Little's vehicle was the result of this illegal detention and should have been suppressed.
Accordingly, this court should reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. Little's motion to
suppress.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on

"t> December, 2011.

JEREMY M. DELICINO
Attorney/for Appellant Todd Little
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